Currently 2.1 million couples in the United States experience difficulties in conceiving a child even after a year of unprotected intercourse. Whilst various infertility treatment options are available to assist these couples, they are often extremely costly. From 1977-2001, several US states mandated health insurance providers to offer coverage for infertility treatment. Although the majority of past literature has studied impacts on older women who are likely to seek treatment, this paper proposes that the mandates may have had a wider impact on the US population. Specifically, it may have given an option for younger women to delay birth since these policies reduced the opportunity cost of having a child in the future. Results estimated by the discrete-time proportional hazard model with piece-wise constant baseline hazard and gamma heterogeneity suggest a significant delay in the time of first birth among highly educated white women. Moreover, the size of the delay depends on the age at which women became exposed to the mandates. Specifically, women who were affected by the policy at the age of 25 and 30 each exhibit a delay of 1.5 and 2 years respectively. This result in turn suggests potential increases in the health care costs in the future due to various negative maternal and infant health consequences of childbearing by older mothers.
Introduction
Currently 2.1 million couples in the United States (NSFG 2002) experience difficulties in conceiving a child even after a year of unprotected intercourse. The figures for the proportion of women who faced impaired fecundity increased from 8 percent in 1982 to 10 percent in 1995 (Chandra and Stephen, 1998) . Whilst various infertility treatment options are available to assist these couples, they are often extremely costly. Some countries provide financial help but in the U.S., patients often faced the full financial burden of the treatment. 1 Between 1977 and 2001, state-level legislation was introduced in 13 states which mandated health insurance providers to offer coverage for the fertility treatment cost. Mosher and Bachrach (1996) suggest that the observed increase in the number of US women suffering from infertility problems is not caused by an increase in the rate of infertility but rather due to more women postponing their fertility activities. This delay of motherhood is prominent among women with higher educational attainment as well as stronger labor market attachment (Rindfuss, Morgan, and Offutt, 1996) . One possible reason for observing the delay particularly among highly educated women is the difficulties they face in balancing work and life. Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001) document that, on average, women have more job interruptions than men and 80 percent of these interruptions are related to motherhood. Since there is a substantial amount of evidence pointing out possible detrimental impacts of career interruptions on women's future wages (for example, see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Altug and Miller, 1998; Korenman and Neumark, 1992) , women with high career ambitions may be postponing births to advance in their workplaces.
If this is the case, the introduction of state-level infertility insurance mandates may have induced women to further delay giving birth, since the knowledge of accessible and affordable infertility treatment may have led women to focus on their careers for a longer period of their lives and postpone giving birth. Given that the majority of women who obtain treatment are older and highly educated white women who have stronger attachment to the labor market, such an argument is rather plausible (Bitler and Schmidt, 2007) .
At first glance, women having the choice to delay birth seems to be welfare improving. However, since fecundity is closely related to the age of women, the increase in the age at first birth is likely to create various health concerns. For example, Menken, Trussell, and Larsen (1986) report that delay of birth from the age group 25-29 to 30-34 increases the proportion of infertile women from 9 to 15%. Moreover, first births at older ages are associated with severe health risks for both the mothers and the new born children. (the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), 2003). The probability of down syndrome increases for birth after 30. Moreover, the probabilities of miscarriages and pregnancy complications also increase for older mothers. Consequently, the delay would likely to increase the heath care costs due not only to the higher demand for infertility treatment but also to the more intensive pre and post-natal care required.
1 For example, public system in Denmark offers up to three in vitro fertilization for free.
Reflecting these concerns, this paper studies how the U.S. infertility insurance mandates affected the timing of first birth of young women by employing the framework of event history analysis. The impacts of mandates are identified using the difference-in-differences approach by comparing the timing of births for women residing in states with and without the mandates. The main data is taken from the 1980-1997 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Previous literature on the US infertility insurance mandates has mainly focused on the impact of mandates on the take up and the outcomes of treatment among an older group of women. This is a logical choice of the age group as women who need and thus access the treatment are often those who are above 35. There is, however, one main paper by Buckles (2007) which looks at the impact on younger women. Similarly to this paper, she also investigates how the insurance mandates affected the timing of birth using cross-sectional data. This paper presents a complementary evidence to the findings of Buckles (2007) . Particularly, it adds to the literature using an advantageous characteristic of longitudinal data, namely the ability to follow each individual over time. This feature is particularly important for this paper for the following three reasons. Firstly, the availability of longitudinal data enables the selection of individuals who resided in mandated states long enough to be affected. This is not possible when cross-sectional data is employed as each individual is only observed once on an interview day. Secondly, due to the limitation of cross-sectional data, Buckles (2007) identifies the policy impact by using the behavior of an older cohort of women as a predictor for that of a younger cohort of women in 10 to 20 years time. In order to do so, she needs to make an implicit assumption that there are age but no cohort specific effects. This paper relaxes this assumption using the duration analysis framework. In particular, controlling for cohort effects and other demographic and economic characteristics, this paper follows the same individuals to understand how they changed their probability of giving birth over time. Lastly, from cross-sectional data, we cannot know what happened to women beyond the interview dates. Therefore, we cannot identify whether the decline in the observed probability of birth is due to women delaying birth or simply not having children at all. The longitudinal data employed in this paper allows us to follow individuals until births. Moreover, the empirical method in this paper can be used to account for those who remained childless and were censored at the end of the observation period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section looks at background information regarding the U.S. infertility treatment and the health insurance system as well as the structure of the state mandates. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework and 4 looks at the past literature. Section 5 and 6 each describes the identification strategy and the empirical specification. Section 7 presents the data used for the analysis. Section 8 and 9 describe the results and robustness analysis respectively. Section 10 concludes. 4 2 Background
Infertility treatment
The initial step taken by couples seeking for treatment is the examination of both partners' reproductive organs. As a next step, the majority undergo several less invasive methods such as the use of fertility drugs which induce women to produce multiple eggs per ovulation. If the cause of infertility is clear, women proceed straight to surgery in order, for example, to unblock their fallopian tubes. Whilst most women successfully conceive a child without using more invasive methods, a small proportion of women proceeds to receive treatment via the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), which are any treatments that handle either sperms and eggs or both. Details of these treatments are summarized in Table 1 in the appendix.
Although two thirds of couples who seek treatment in the U.S. successfully conceive children, the success rates vary significantly with the age of women. For example, the pregnancy rates of ART for women aged 29 is 44.9 percent but this figure drops to 37.6 percent for women aged 35 (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005) .
Infertility treatments are often very costly. Hormone therapies which are used to induce the releasing of an egg could cost between $50 and $5,000 per cycle whilst tubal surgery would cost between $3,000 and $10,000 (see Table 1 in the appendix). One of the most expensive treatments, the In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) on average costs $12,400 per cycle although this treatment only accounts for approximately 5 percent of the U.S. infertility treatment (ASRM, 2009 ) . When these treatments are combined or used for repeated cycles, the financial burden for patients quickly becomes too heavy for them to continue the infertility treatment.
Structure of health insurance in the United States
Unlike other Western nations, the U.S. does not have an universal health care coverage. Instead, high medical cost is covered by various forms of health care insurance. The US health care insurance can be divided into public and private insurance. Public or federally funded programs are under the control of federal laws and currently cover approximately 27 percent or 85 million individuals that often face difficulties obtaining private insurance policies (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, Smith, and the Bureau of the Census, 2008). Private insurance, however, is the relevant insurance for the purpose of this paper as the state-level mandates only affect those that are insured privately.
Private insurance policies are either purchased individually or through employers under the group purchasing agreements. Whilst only 9 percent of individuals purchase their own insurance, almost two thirds obtain their coverage through their employers (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008) . The importance of employer sponsored insurance in the U.S. is evident from the sheer number of individuals that are covered by their employers. However, the increasing cost of medical care in the U.S. has also posed significant financial difficulties for the employers. As a result, individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance are likely to be working as full-time employees in large firms (Sullivan, Miller, Feldman, and Dowd, 1992) .
One form of private insurance which became increasingly important during the period of interest is the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). HMOs are health care plans developed to cut the soaring health care costs. In this system, the care providers charge a low fee for a health care service and in return, employers who contract with HMOs ensure a steady inflow of patients. The introduction of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 enforced employers with more than 25 employees to offer federally certified HMO options as well as traditional indemnity insurance plans when requested. Although HMOs were only 16 percent of the market share in 1988, this figure increased to 31 percent by 1996 (Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whitmore, Finder, DiJulio, and Hawkins, 2006) . A large proportion of US women have attained their health insurance coverage through either their or their dependents' employers who in turn ask their insurance packages to be administered by HMOs.
Infertility insurance mandates
As a way to provide coverage for the cost of infertility treatment, each state individually implemented insurance mandates between 1977 and 2001 (see Table 2 in the appendix).
The extent of coverage varies across the states and these differences in the generosity of coverage stem from three main components. 2 Firstly, there are mainly two types of mandates implemented.
"mandate to cover" regulates insurance companies to cover the infertility treatment cost regardless of the policy purchased. This is a stronger form of legislation compared to "mandate to offer" which requires insurance companies to offer the option for consumers to purchase the coverage. Secondly, some states cover the cost of the In vitro fertilization (IVF) while the others do not. Although IVF is not one of the most commonly used treatments, it is the most costly option. As a result, the differential degree of coverage for IVF by each state creates variations in the generosity of financial support given to couples. Lastly, some states implemented the mandates for HMOs whilst others excluded them from the need to cover the treatment costs. As mentioned in the previous section, HMOs play an increasingly important role in the US health insurance system. States with mandates which include HMOs, therefore, would be more likely to have a larger impact on the timing of birth than those without.
One thing to note is the lack of age limits in most states. In fact until after 2000, no states had any imposition of age restrictions. This is slightly surprising as the treatment success rates are heavily dependent on the age of women. Such lack of restriction may have acted as another factor to encourage women to delay giving birth.
Theoretical framework
There is substantial evidence pointing out a negative relationship between women's work and fertility. In particular, various papers (for example see Altug and Miller, 1998; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Gronau, 1988; and Korenman and Neumark, 1992) provide empirical evidence that career interruption leads to lower human capital accumulation and wages. Moreover, Gronau (1988) and Korenman and Neumark (1992) specifically look at fertility related withdrawals from labor force and show that such career interrruptions lead to lower income. Heckman and Willis (1976) , illustrates a delay of birth when a couple experience a steeply rising income profile. They use a dynamic fertility model where individuals maximize discounted value of utility over her lifetime given a flow budget constraint. They assume that couples can choose, in any months of the fertile period, the level of contraception and hence the probability of conception.
Under this theoretical framework, they find that couples sustain a high level of contraception until their flow of income is sufficiently high to conceive a child. Given this theory together with the empirical evidence from above, women have incentives to delay birth in order to minimize the loss of wages, and seeing that their income profiles would improve due to hard work during their earlier years provide additional incentive for women to further delay giving birth.
When women determine when to have a child, however, they have another factor to consider, namely the biological constraint. Women could postpone giving birth if they consistently stay fertile.
Women's fecundity, however, declines with age. The introduction of infertility insurance mandates reduced the price of treatment and made it possible for women to have a child for a longer period of their lives. As a result, the policy introductions effectively reduced the opportunity cost of having a child in the future.
Additionally, the introduction of mandates may generate moral hazard. It is likely that not many women possess knowledge of the procedures and the costs of various infertility treatments in detail before they try to conceive through natural method. However, a study by Hewlett (2004) suggest that women are aware of the fact that the treatment relaxes their fertility constraint. In fact, they may be over-estimating the effectiveness of infertility treatments as approximately 89 percent of young career driven women believe that infertility treatment enables them to have a child well into their 40s when in fact the treatment success rate drops sharply after the age of 35. Knowing that infertility treatment could bring them a child in the future together with the knowledge that their health insurance covers the cost of the treatment in the future, they are presented with an additional incentive to delay giving birth.
Although the introduction of mandates reduced the cost of future treatment, the financial burden faced by the health insurance providers was likely to have been passed on to the consumers in the form of either reduced wages if individuals obtained their insurance through their employers or higher premiums or both. There are no studies that investigated the effect of the infertility insurance mandates, however, several studies used other health insurance mandates to understand the impact on wages and premiums. Using 1989 cross sectional data, Acs, Winterbottom, and Zedlewski (1992) note that the health insurance mandates increased premiums by 4 to 13 percent. Gruber (1994) , on the other hand, studies how the state maternity mandates introduced in three states affected the wages, and concludes that the full cost of mandates was paid by women aged between 20 and 40.
Such an increase in the premiums reduces the demand for health insurance and thus the number of individuals affected by the policies are likely to have declined. A change in wages, on the other hand, generates both income and substitution effects. The reduction of wages leads women to delay birth due to an income effect. The substitution effect, however, predicts two opposing outcomes.
Since work does not pay as much as before, women would shift away from consuming goods into leisure. This implies, on the one hand, if having a child is complementary to consumption goods, then the reduction of wages would lead women to delay birth. If, on the other hand, childbearing is complementary to leisure, such reduction shortens the time to birth.
Literature
The majority of the previous literature has focused on the impact of the mandates on older women. This is a natural choice of group as these are the women who are more likely to seek treatment. On the contrary, this paper sheds light on how the mandates changed the fertility timing preferences of younger women when they take account of the availability of cheaper infertility treatments.
The introductions of mandates are thought to have increased the use of various infertility treatments and thus are likely to have affected the birth rate. Using 1985-1999 Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and the Census Bureau, Schmidt (2005; 2007) look at the policy impacts on the rate of first birth. Estimates from a difference-in-differences as well as difference-in-difference-indifferences estimator show that while the mandates did not significantly affect all US women, white women who were older than 35 experienced a significant increase in the rate of first birth (ranging between 19 and 32 percent). Bundorf, Henne and Baker(2007) study how the mandates affected the access to and the aggressiveness of ART. Due to the high cost of these treatments, women may implant multiple embryos per cycle in the hope to increase the success rate and reduce the number of cycles they need to undergo. However, such action would increase the rate of multiple births which is taxing both for Reproductive Technologies, they estimate the policy impact using a difference-in-differences estimator and conclude that the mandates increased the utilization of ART, however the aggressiveness of the treatment did not change even after the introduction of mandates. and finds that the probability of twin birth increased by 10 percent. Although no effect of mandates on birth outcomes are found for young women aged below 30, she finds some negative impacts on the birth outcomes of the twins and singletons among older women.
Whilst these past studies have focused on how the mandates affected an older group of women, it is also possible that these state mandates influenced women who were considering a potential use of treatment in the future. In other words, the introduction of mandates may have encouraged younger women to delay giving birth. If women in the mandated states were indeed delaying their timing of birth, findings from Schmidt (2005; 2007) and Bundorf et al. (2007) not only show increase in the number of first births due to more easily accessible treatment but also reflects more women at older ages giving birth because of their planned delay of birth. This interpretation also fits with the results presented by Bitler (2008) . The negative birth outcomes found among older women may be due to more women giving birth at a later age. This in turn highlights the importance of studying the timing of birth effect. Buckles (2007) investigates whether women delayed births in response to these policies. Using the 1982-1999 Current Population Survey, she first looks at how the birth rates of older women aged between 35 and 44 changed before and after the introduction of mandates using a differencein-differences estimator and finds that women residing in mandated states increased the birth rate by approximately 40 percent after five years of coverage. She, however, argues that estimates may simply be picking up the ability of older women to give birth due to the increasing availability of infertility treatment over time. In order to identify the cause of the delay, she then looks at how the birth rates of younger women were affected. The estimate suggests that women aged between 22 and 25 as well as 26 and 30 both decreased the birth rates by approximately 26 percent after five years of coverage. Bundolf et al. (2007) also devotes a small section to this issue and present similar difference-in-differences estimates which indicate that the birth rate of women aged 25-29 decreased while it increased for women aged 35-39.
Although the evidence presented by Buckles (2007) and Bundolf et al. (2007) indicates a potential delaying effect of the mandates, they both assume that the behavior of the older cohort of women proxies for that of the younger cohort in 10 or 20 years time. Given that the lifestyles of women changed drastically over the period of observation, this may be a rather strong assumption.
Moreover, the repeated cross sectional data only allows one to observe the fertility activity until the interview date and thus makes it difficult to investigate whether these young individuals are delaying births or simply not having any children at all. As a result, one may obtain an even stronger understanding of the policy impact by following how the same women responded to the mandates at different points of their lives. This paper, hence, proposes to use the framework of the duration analysis using longitudinal data in order to investigate how the mandates affected the timing of birth.
Identification strategies
Special care is needed when studying the timing of birth using longitudinal data. Firstly, unlike other subjects of economic studies such as unemployment, a woman gives birth to the first child only once in her life time. As a result, we fail to observe the timing of first birth of the same individual with and without the policy even with the availability of longitudinal data. Secondly, women's lifestyle and fertility behavior changed drastically over the sample years.
Taking account of the first point, it is necessary to compare the influence of the mandates on the timing of birth across individuals over time. However, the second point raises a concern that one cohort of women observed in later years are not comparable to those from earlier years. Instead, I attempt to identify the policy impact by defining a comparison group which includes women who have similar characteristics but were unaffected by the mandates. Using this comparison group, the policy impact is uncovered by evaluating the change in differences before and after the policy introduction dates. I, therefore, employ a difference-in-differences estimator exploiting the variation in exposure to cheaper infertility treatment across both states and time. One crucial assumption for the difference-in-differences is that the two groups of women must experience a common trend.
The natural choice of the control group is women who were residing in states without mandates.
The affected group would include women who were residing in mandated states. The generosity of coverage varied significantly across states (see Section 2.3). Therefore, another ideal second affected group would include five states that mandated more generous coverage of treatment. These states include Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Islands (Highlighted in green in Table   2 ). All these five states introduced "mandate to cover", included IVF treatment and mandates were applied to all firms apart from those with self-funded insurance. As a result, separate estimates are presented using the second definition of the affected group.
Empirical specifications
This paper analyses the impact of US infertility insurance mandates on the timing of first birth using the framework of duration analysis. PSID records birth month and year of children born to women in the core sample. Due to the grouped nature of the data and the flexibility to incorporate a nonparametric baseline hazard, this paper employs a discrete-time proportional hazard model.
The underlying continuous-time hazard, which is the conditional hazard rate of having a first child, for the ith individual at time j is given by
(1) λ(j) is the baseline hazard and x i (j) denotes covariates to control for the ith individual's characteristics. In this paper, j is measured in age years, and the discrete nature of the PSID data implies that a birth is recorded to have been given in the jth age if she gave birth on the continuous time scale of between (j − 1) and j. The discrete hazard function, thus, characterizes the probability of first birth by the jth age provided that she has not yet given birth by the j − 1th age.
where
.
In order to allow the baseline hazard to be flexible, a piece-wise constant specification is chosen.
By fitting a period specific indicator variable, γ(j), the baseline hazard is allowed to vary across periods. The covariate vector x i (j) is assumed to be time-invariant within an interval but changes across intervals. x i (j) contains individual and state-level characteristics, a time-invariant P olicy dummy that picks up states which introduced the infertility insurance mandates. The most important variable for our analysis is M andate i (j − 2). It is an indicator variable that equals one if the individual was residing in a state where the mandate had been introduced for at least two years.
This definition allows individuals two years to respond to the introduction of mandates. In a usual framework of difference-in-differences, this dummy variable is the interaction between the P olicy dummy and another dummy that indicates years after policies are introduced. The coefficient δ 2 captures the policy impact which is identified by taking the differences in
between the two groups of states and evaluating the change in these differences before and after the introduction of mandates.
The discrete hazard function specified in Eq. (2) allows the set of covariates, and importantly, the M andate dummy to proportionally affect the baseline hazard function. The shape of the baseline hazard, however, is common between the two groups. Since the focus of this paper is to identify how long women delayed their first birth, an alternative hazard specification is given by
Eq. (4) specifies flexible estimation of duration dependence by treatment status. Given the discrete hazard function in either Eq. (2) or (4), the discrete survival function is given by
Let c i be an indicator variable that equals one if the spell is censored and zero if uncensored.
The contribution of the ith individual to the likelihood function is
Until now, the analysis assumed that there is no unobserved heterogeneity. However, Lancaster(1980) and Van den Berg (2001) point out that uncontrolled unobserved heterogeneity would cause spurious negative duration dependence as those with higher hazards tend to exit first. By taking account of the unobserved heterogeneity, the discrete hazard functions with the unobserved heterogeneity are given by
and
where i is the unobserved heterogeneity which is assumed to follow a gamma distribution. The choice of a gamma distribution as the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is rather convenient as all the relevant functions have closed form solutions. Moreover, Abbring and Van den Berg (2007) showed that when the unobserved heterogeneity is specified to proportionally affect the hazard, the unobserved heterogeneity distribution converges rapidly to a gamma distribution. 3
The likelihood contribution for a person with a spell length j is
Data
The main data used for the analysis is the 1980-1997 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID).
PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal data and the data is collected both at the individual and family level. The number of households surveyed initially in 1968 was 4,800 but the sample size increased to 7000 households by 2000 as the children of initial core sample members left households to establish their own family. From 1973, interviews were conducted over the phone and computer assisted phone surveys were introduced from 1993.
While repeated cross-sectional data have attractive features such as the large number of births and sample size, panel data presents us with several advantages. One major merit is the ability of longitudinal data to follow the same individuals. This is a crucial feature for our analysis for three reasons. Firstly, the main focus of this paper is to see how women changed their fertility behavior over time. Secondly, identifying the policy impacts requires one to know whether women stayed in a particular state long enough for the mandates to have had some impacts on their timing of birth. From the cross sectional data, it is not possible to unveil this information as they only reveal in which state the individual was residing in at the time of interview. Lastly, fertility histories of women can reasonably be recovered from earlier waves. This ensures a correct selection of women, namely those without any children, into the sample.
The period of observation is chosen to be between 1980 and 1997. As shown in Figure 2 , most states introduced the mandates between mid 1980s and early 1990s. The period of observation, therefore, allows us to observe how the fertility behavior changed over years in response to the mandates. The year 1997 is chosen as the end of the observation period, since the frequency of PSID data collection changed from annually to every other year after 1997. This is problematic for the analysis, since information on the state of residence would be missing for the year that was not collected. 4
3 Another possible approach is to use the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator which fits an arbitrary distribution of unobserved frailty approximated by a set of mass points and the probability of a person at each mass point ( (Heckman and Singer, 1984) ). However, Baker and Melino (2000) , through a Monte Carlo experiment, showed that estimating both flexible duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity leads to a significant bias in the parameters of these components. They identify the cause of this bias to be the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE) to find too many spurious mass points.
4 Additional regression is estimated using data from 1980 to 2005 for robustness check. Individuals recorded to have resided in the same state before and after the missing years are assumed to have not moved across states. Although
Observations are selected using flow-sampling and are organized in a person-year format. The flow-sampling is chosen over stock sampling, since the probability of being included in a sample is higher for individuals with longer durations under stock sampling. To avoid such length bias, the flow sampling approach is employed. The person-year format implies that the same individual appears in the sample as many years until she either gives birth to her first child or she reaches the end of the observation period without giving birth. The width of the step, a year, is decided in order to impose less parametric structure on the baseline hazard whilst having enough birth observations. The focus of this paper is to identify the policy impacts on women's timing of birth, and so a cohort of women who turned between 20 and 30 anytime during the observation period are included in the sample.
Some women in PSID moved to different states during the observation period. These women have likely experienced limited influence from the mandates as their stay in a mandated state was short. It is, therefore, rather difficult to determine whether they should be included in the treatment or the control groups as such short stays may or may not be sufficient for individuals to be affected by the mandates. As a result, only women who did not move are included in the sample. 5 After selecting groups of individuals for the analysis, the number of individuals in the sample became 1992.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the individual gave first birth in a particular year. The demographic variables included are characteristics that are likely to affect fertility decisions such as women's educational level, ethnicity, age in the initial period and its square.
The regional and year dummies as well as state-level economic characteristics are also included in order to allow for differential characteristics across regions and years. 6 During the 17 year period being considered in the analysis, female labor force participation increased and women's lifestyles and preferences drastically changed. Moreover, availability of infertility treatment increased over years. As a result, individuals from later periods are more likely to give birth at an older age.
In order to control for this differential fertility timing across cohorts, indicator variables that take account of when women entered the sample are included. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the PSID sample used in this paper. The first column shows the statistics for all individuals and the second and third columns give statistics for women residing in states that introduced state mandates sometime during the observation period and non-mandated states respectively. Identification strategy in this paper requires the exogenous introduction of the mandates. If states introduced their policies due to the increasing demand for the conclusion remain the same, the magnitude of the estimates are smaller when additional years of observations are included. One possible explanation for this finding is that individuals moved across states during the years when interviews were not carried out. As a result, the mandated group may have included individuals who did not stay in the mandated state long enough to be affected. The results are available upon request.
5 Even when these movers are included, the general conclusion remains the same but the estimated policy effect is less significant. Such reduction in the significance level may be reflecting the inclusion of unaffected individuals in the affected group. The results are available upon request.
6 The state-level economic indicators are calculated using the 1980-1997 March Current Population Survey (CPS). CPS is a repeated cross-sectional survey collecting information from over 50,000 households. treatment, the demographic characteristics of the two groups of women would differ and the key coefficient estimate would be biased.
Comparing the statistics, these two groups of women have similar averages in most variables.
However, there are minor differences in their characteristics. For example, there seems to be a higher concentration of blacks in the non-mandated states. Moreover, women in mandated states are more highly educated and earn approximately $4000 more. Since women who have access to infertility treatment are generally more highly educated and have higher earnings, this raises a concern over the validity of the identification strategy employed in this paper. To further investigate this issue, Figure 1 displays the trends of birth rates during the pre-policy period (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) for the treatment and control groups separately. If states that introduced their mandates did so due to increasing demand for infertility treatment, we should observe differing trends between the two groups. However, Figure 1 presents a common downward trend for both groups of states. Additional robustness checks are carried out in order to ensure comparability of these two states in Section 9.
Results
This paper investigates how the timing of first birth changed after the introduction of state infertility insurance mandates. The Kaplan-Meier product limit estimates of the smoothed hazard functions are plotted in Figure 2 for the two groups. The figure on the left hand side shows the Kaplan-Meier product limit estimates when the entire sample is used while the figure on the right presents estimates of women with more than 13 years of education. When the entire sample is included, the hazard rate for individuals in the mandated states(mandated group) indicate higher hazard rate than those in the non-mandated states. This implies that the probabilities of having a first child were higher for women residing in the treatment states. However, when we restrict the sample to only include highly educated women with more than 13 years of education, the figure indicates that the affected women initially experienced less probabilities of first births compared to those who were unaffected. Therefore, as noted by Bitler and Schmidt (2007) , these figures indicate a delay of first birth when we only look at highly educated women. This is most likely due to the nature of the legislation.
Specifically, the insurance mandates only affected women who had the health insurance. Women with more education are more likely either to obtain the health insurance through their employers or be covered through their partners' health insurance.
Turning to the regression estimates, the discrete-time proportional hazard model with gamma unobserved heterogeneity discussed in Eq. (2) are estimated and the results are presented in Table   4 . This specification allows for a vertical shift of the baseline hazard function proportionally to the set of demographic characteristics, but the shape of the baseline hazard function is unaltered across groups of individuals. The estimates presented in Table 4 , therefore, show the scaling factor of the baseline hazard function. 7
The "Mandate" dummy selects a subgroup of women from the affected group. In particular, it picks out women from the group of affected women who were living in a state and had already been exposed to the mandates for at least two years. Its coefficient, therefore, measures the impact of the mandates. A negative coefficient implies a delay of birth as it indicates a smaller probability of first birth. The M andate dummy is interacted with race to identify race specific impacts.
The first column of Table 4 shows the estimates when the treatment and control groups are defined as all mandated states and non-mandated states respectively. 8 The estimates for "Mandate" coefficients from the first column are insignificant and positive and shows no impact of the mandates regardless of race. This result is unchanged even when the affected group is redefined to only include the five states states with more generous coverage (the second column). These five strongly mandated states are Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts and Rhode Island (Highlighted in green in Table 2 ). Since these states provided extensive coverage of the infertility treatment cost, women residing in these five states were more likely to have been presented with a stronger incentive to delay. However, the estimated coefficients are still insignificant. The estimates from the two definitions of the affected group lead to the same conclusion and thus the subsequent analysis will only look at the estimates from the first definition to maintain a sufficiently large sample size for the analysis (i.e. All mandated states compared to non-mandated states).
Results so far show that when the entire sample is considered, the mandates did not significantly affect women's timing of birth. Nevertheless, estimates from these two columns allow the treatment effect to only vary across racial groups, and Bitler and Schmidt (2007) suggest that these mandates affect individuals who were both white and highly educated. Reflecting this point, the third column includes estimates for all mandated states versus non-mandated states but restricting the sample to only include women who had at least 13 years of education. 9 The result from the third column shows that restricting the sample to include only the highly educated women reveals a significantly negative effect among white women. Table 4 merely show how the baseline hazard function is shifted by a constant scale due to the introduction of the mandates. It is, however, very likely that the two groups exhibit different baseline hazard over years in response to the mandates. As a result, Eq. (8) is estimated where the baseline hazard functions are separately estimated for those who were unaffected by the mandates and those who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years. Table 5 presents the estimated baseline hazard coefficients where the width of a period is a year. The first and second columns each shows the estimates for individuals residing in non-mandated and mandated states respectively. The first column shows that, though insignificant, the γ(t) for individuals 7 The standard errors shown in the tables are not corrected for state-level clustering to speed up the computation. However, even after the standard errors are corrected, the conclusions remain unchanged.
Estimates in
8 The estimated coefficients of other covariates are shown in Table 7 . 9 Individuals with more than 13 years of education at the beginning of the observation period are considered to have had at least a first year of undergraduate degree.
who are unaffected by the mandates became larger over time implying the gradual increase in the probability of first birth over the observed years. The second column, on the other hand, shows the difference in the baseline hazard between the two groups. Though only significant in the first five periods, when exposed to the mandates for at least two years, individuals seem to exhibit lower probabilities of birth continuously until the 6th period.
To better illustrate how the probability of giving birth to first child changed over years, Figure   3 plots the predicted hazard functions. Both figures presents white women's predicted probability of having a first child. The left figure, however, illustrates how affected women would exhibit differential trends if they were exposed to the mandates for two years by the time they turned 25 conditional on not having a first child until this age. A similar story is presented also in the right figure, however, the age at which women were exposed to the mandates for two years are now 30.
In both figures, the plotted predicted hazard functions clearly indicate initial lower probabilities of first birth among women affected by the policies. The differences in the probabilities between the two groups are relatively constant until the fifth year. It is not clear from the estimates whether the closing of the probability gaps in the latter periods reflects women catching up on the delayed birth either naturally or by obtaining treatment. In fact, the gap may have closed since women residing in control states experienced significant decline in their fertility level and were less successful in conceiving children without treatment. It is, therefore, not possible to understand whether the delaying effect of the mandates had already diminished by period 6 or that it persisted for a longer period of time if women experienced relatively constant fecundity profile over their life cycles.
On the other hand, the survival functions can be found in Figure 4 . Each point on these lines indicates the probability of remaining childless until a particular age. The thin lines show these probabilities for women who were unaffected by the mandates and the thick lines indicate those women who were exposed to the policies for at least two years at a particular age. From both figures, we again see that the affected women initially were less likely to have their first child and increase their probability of birth in later periods. However, it now becomes clearer that women who were exposed to the mandates at the age of 30 exhibit a greater delay of first birth compared to those who were affected at the age of 25. For example, when we look at the left figure, 50 percent of the unaffected women remain childless until the age 26.5. When the policies are introduced, 50 percent of the affected women remain childless until 28. On the other hand, we observe approximately slightly more than 2 years difference among women who were affected by the mandates at the age of 30.
Robustness checks
The previous section presented evidence of a delay of birth influenced by the introduction of the state infertility insurance mandates. In this section, additional regressions are estimated in order to ensure the robustness of the previous findings.
The first robustness test is regarding the exogeneity of the mandates introduction. The identification strategy in this paper fails if there are systematic differences between mandated and non-mandated states. For instance, the introduction of mandates may reflect greater demands for infertility treatment in these states. In such a case, the two groups of women are no longer comparable to each other and thus are less likely to satisfy the common trend assumption which is crucial for the correct identification of the policy impacts.
However, one thing to note is that the period of observation saw health related insurance mandates to increase by 25 fold across all states (Jensen and Morrisey (1999) ). Those states with infertility insurance in particular introduced a large number of other health insurance mandates.
The introduction may, thus, reflect states' preferences towards insurance mandate legislation and not stronger demands for treatment by women. Nonetheless, three separate regressions are estimated to ensure the exogeneity of the mandates introductions.
Firstly, Eq. 7 is estimated for highly educated women but additional six states without the mandates are included in the affected group. These states are Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma and Virginia and are neighbors to the treated states in order to ensure similarities in economic and cultural characteristics. When economic and religious factors are compared, these six states indeed present similar characteristics to the nearby mandated states. Given that they are similar to those that are treated, the fertility behaviors of women residing in these six states are also likely to be very much alike. If stronger demands led states to introduce these mandates, we should observe an equally strong delaying behavior even when we include the six additional states that had not introduced mandates. Therefore, the estimates from the previous section would be robust if the significance of the estimates diminishes when they are included in the affected group. Assuming that these six states introduced the mandates around the same time as the neighbor states that actually introduced the policies, the first column of Table 6 shows diminished impact of mandates when these six states are added to the affected group. Secondly, Eq. 7 is again estimated including only the highly educated individuals and using the 1970-1985 PSID data. Since all except for West Virginia introduced their mandates after 1985, the period of observation presents women's fertility behavior in the absence of the policy interventions.
West Virginia is the only exception as it introduced its mandate in 1977 and thus is excluded from the estimation. Looking at pre-introduction periods assures similarities in fertility behavior between the treatment and control groups and hence ensure the robustness of the identification strategy. The second column of Table 6 shows the result from the regression and it verifies the exogeneity of the policy introductions as the coefficient on the M andate dummies are statistically insignificant for all race. Moreover, although not included in the table, Eq. 8 is also estimated to see possible differential trends in probabilities of birth between the two groups. Figure 5 , however, clearly presents that these two groups exhibited a very similar trend ensuring the common trend assumption.
The third robustness check is related to the second. It again estimates the same regression as before, but the affected group is redefined to only include states with more generous coverage.
If states introduced mandates due to higher levels of demand for treatment, it is very likely that states with generous coverage exhibit even a stronger demand. Therefore, whilst the second test gives a confirmation of the exogeneity of the policy introductions, the third strengthens the finding.
Estimates from the third column shows that even when the redefined definition of the affected group is used, the coefficients of interest are still insignificant. 10 These three tests together provide some reassurances of the robustness of the findings from the previous section.
Another concern is regarding the influence of mandates on the premiums and wages. Since the mandates require insurance providers to cover the treatment cost, their burden may have been passed onto those who purchased the insurance in the form of higher premiums or lower wages.
The increase of premiums may have reduced the impacts of the mandates due to less women or families purchasing the insurance policies. On the other hand, lower wages have both the income and substitution effects which may offset each other (see Section 3). Jensen and Morrisey (1999) show that the introduction of health insurance mandates indeed resulted in the increase of premiums.
Moreover, those who had employer-sponsored health insurance experienced reduced levels of wage and benefits. However, since Jensen and Morrisey (1999) also noted that health insurance mandates increased by 25 fold between 1970 and 1996 in all the US states, it is likely that all US citizens faced a rise in their premiums and reduction in wages caused by different sets of health care mandates regardless of the state of residence during the period of observation. Since the identification strategy employed in this paper defines a control group, the effect of the premium increase is eliminated as long as both groups of women experienced a similar level of increase.
Nevertheless, another regression is estimated and the results are included in the fourth column of Table 6 . This regression excludes the five states with generous coverage. Since the rise in the premiums is due to the increased cost of coverage, the generous mandates in these five states most likely have increased the premiums the most. Excluding them, thus, limits the impact of the increased premiums. The estimates, however, show very similar policy effects even when the sample is restricted.
As a final robustness check, the definition of the M andate dummy is redefined so that it now equals one if a woman is residing in a state with a mandate that has been introduced for at least three years instead of two. This is to test whether two years since the introduction of mandates are enough for affected women to respond to the policy introductions. From the fifth column of Table   6 , the estimated effect of the mandates seems to be very similar regardless of the definition of the M andate dummy.
10 These results add evidence to the findings by Bitler (2008) and Hamilton and McManus (2005) . Bitler (2008) find that the health status as well as the rate of twin birth between 1981 and 1984 are not significantly different between the two groups of states. Hamilton and McManus (2005) , on the other hand, shows that the demographic characteristics of the two groups of states are not different regardless of whether they adopted coverage for IVF or not.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of the US infertility state mandates on the timing of first birth. A discrete-time proportional hazard model is estimated allowing for a flexible nonparametric baseline hazard as well as gamma unobserved heterogeneity.
In contrast to the past literature which has focused on how these mandates affect older women, the present paper looks at policy impacts on younger women. In other words, while women who undergo infertility treatment are generally older, it proposes an existence of a potential effect on younger cohorts of women who were likely to have been planning to have a child in the future. Facing the difficulties in balancing work and life, these women may have incorporated the availability of cheap and thus more accessible treatments into their life cycle plan. If this is the case, we should observe a delay in the time to first birth among the affected women.
The results from the discrete-time proportional hazard model indicate an insignificant effect of the mandates when the entire sample is included and the effect is assumed to be the same across educational group. However, a significant negative effect of these mandates on the timing of first birth is observed among white women with higher education. Moreover, when separate baseline hazard functions are estimated, evidence suggest that individuals affected by the mandates for at least two years were delaying birth. Moreover, the size of the delay depended on at which age these women became exposed to the mandates. For example, at the median, affected white women are estimated to have delayed their first birth for 1.5 years if they were exposed to the legislation at the age of 23. The size of delay becomes even larger when they were affected at the age of 28. In particular, these women are observed to have delayed their first birth for 2 years. This implies that, conditional on women remaining childless until 30, white women in states with no mandate had their first child at the age of 33. However, those with mandates gave birth when they were 35. This is a crucial finding as the worsening of the health outcomes is particularly severe for women giving birth at or above the age 35. Such an increase in the age at first birth among women between 20 and 30 would increase the percentage of women facing infertility problems by approximately 14.5%.
Furthermore, the use of ART increases by approximately 20.6 %. Various robustness checks are also conducted and they yield supporting evidence strengthening the findings of this paper.
The findings in this paper demonstrate that the introduction of infertility insurance state mandates not only affected those who are directly targeted, but had a much wider policy impact on the timing of birth. Further research is also needed in order to uncover how the timing of second birth was affected by these mandates. Due to the delay of first birth, women may have had their second child significantly after the age of 35 further increasing the risks of facing infertility. Notes: This figure presents the trend of birth rates in the two groups of states prior to the introduction of mandates (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) . The thick red line shows the birth rates of women residing in the states that introduced the mandates during the observation period (Treatment group) while the thin line indicates that of women residing in states without the mandates (Control Group). 
Smoothed hazard estimates
Note: In each of these figures, the Kaplan-Meier product limit estimates of the smoothed hazard functions are plotted for two groups separately.
Every point on these lines displays the probability of having a first child at a particular age. The thin lines show the hazard for women who are unaffected by the mandates whilst the thick lines present the hazard for women who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years at a particular age. Specifically, for both figures, women were aged between 20 and 30 in the initial period. Notes: In each of these figures, the predicted hazard functions of white highly educated women are plotted for two groups separately. Every point on these lines displays the probability of having a first child at a particular age. The thin lines show the predicted hazard for women who are unaffected by the mandates whilst the thick lines present the predicted hazard for women who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years. Specifically, in each of the figure on the left and right hand side, women were exposed to the mandates for at least two years by the time they turned 25 and 30 respectively. Notes: These figures present the survival functions of white highly educated women. Each point on these lines indicates the probability of remaining childless until a particular age. The thin lines show these probabilities for women who were unaffected by the mandates and the thick lines indicate those for women who were exposed to the policies for at least two years at a particular age. For example, the left and the right hand side figures each compares the survival probabilities of unaffected women and women who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years at the age of 25 and 30 respectively. Note: This figure displays the survival function calculated using pre-policy period data (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) . Every point on each line indicates the probability of remaining childless until a particular age. The thin lines show these probabilities for women who were unaffected by the mandates and the thick lines indicate those for women who were exposed to the policies for two years at the age of 25. Notes: This table displays key policy impact variables from discrete-time proportional hazard estimates with piece-wise constant baseline hazard and gamma unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals one if birth observed and 0 otherwise. The flexible baseline hazard is assumed to be common between the treatment and control groups. Column (1) shows regression results when all women, who turned between 20 and 30 every year during the observation period 1980-1997, are included. Column (2), on the other hand, are estimates when the treatment group is redefined to only include women residing in states with generous mandates. The control group still remains the same as those residing in non-mandated states. Lastly, in column (3), the same treatment and control groups as column (1) are used, however, the sample is restricted to only include women with at least 13 years of education. The estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in the appendix. Covariates included are: age of individuals in the first year of observation and its squared term, race, education and region of residence dummies, state-level characteristics, 
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